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Abstract: This paper describes and analyses the response of UK civil society in the
early months of the Covid-19 crisis, roughly the period March to July 2020. While
focussing primarily on civil society actors, the paper includes an exploration of
how civil society and the national government interacted with each other. It
considers the extent to which responses to the Covid-19 crisis reflect familiar
patterns of behaviour by civil society in theUK, and in the relationship between the
government and ‘third sector’. The paper concludes by pointing to emergent issues
for civil society as the UK looked towards recovery from the initial wave of crisis.
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1 Introduction
How should governments respond to the approach of a global pandemic? How
should they prepare their citizens and their health services? What equipment and
food should be stockpiled? Should they impose restrictions on population move-
ments? How should they balance threats to health against threats to the economy
or children’s education? What expectations should be placed on civil society to
partner with governmental agencies?
These major questions continued to be debated within the UK during the late
summer of 2020 (when this paper was written) with little consensus about the
wisdom of what the national government actually did during the early days of the
Covid-19 crisis or about what it should be doing to prepare for future waves of
infection . Indeed the lack of consensus about how to respond to the crisis was
reflected from the start, in differing advice and response policies in different parts
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of the UK.1 Yet if lessons are to be learned about social and public policy responses
to pandemics, analysts will need not only retrospective historical analysis but also
records of how the crisis was experienced and how civil society2 responded at the
time. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a contemporary record and to
explore emergent policy and organisational themes.
The paper draws on documentary material from contemporary news reports
and commentaries, in print and electronic media, collected by the author in the
period from the end of February to the end of July 2020; the initial phase of
the Covid-19 crisis in the UK. In analysing the documentarymaterials collected, the
author was informed not only by her knowledge of UK civil society behaviour in
pre-Covid-19 times but also by her own experience of living through the evolving
crisis in an English suburb, as both a citizen and a volunteer. Nonprofit and civil
society scholars are often participants in the very phenomena which they study
and this experience can add value to their research when used, as here, in a
reflexive manner (Dean 2017; Glassner and Hertz 2003; Harris 2001).
The paper highlights four aspects of UK civil society activity in the initial
weeks of the crisis: local responses to the needs of those identified as vulnerable;
volunteering with established charities; spontaneous volunteering; and chal-
lenges of organisation and governance. It goes on to point to five aspects of civil
society activity in the UK during the period April–July as civil society responses to
the crisis consolidated: digital volunteering; network formation; citizen support
for the NHS; the national government’s own initiative to recruit volunteers; and
formalisation of spontaneous informal initiatives.
The latter part of the papermoves beyond description to propose points of note
for public policy. It considers the extent to which responses to the crisis reflect
earlier patterns of civil society behaviour2 and earlier patterns in the relationship
between government and the ‘third sector’ in the UK. It also looks at where the
1 The ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (the UK) has a national Government
based in Westminster, London which is currently headed by Boris Johnson as Prime Minister. Con-
stituent nations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales each have varied and limited powers to
order some of their own affairs. Accordingly, Covid-19 mitigation policies have been implemented in
differingways in each of the areas. In this paperwe refer to the behaviour and policies of the national
UK government and to the behaviour and policies of local governmental authorities in England.
2 This paper follows an international tradition of using the term ‘civil society’ as a synonym for the
variously termed ‘nonprofit’, ‘third’, ‘voluntary’ or ‘NGO’ sector; the sphere of organised activity
which is neither governmental nor commercial in its auspices. In this sense, civil society includes
not only formal service-delivering organisations but also smaller third sector organisations with
few or no paid staff; political associations; voluntary membership associations; local community
organisations; mutual aid groups; volunteering; groupings with philanthropic intent; public
protest and dissent; e-activism; on-line petitioning; and spontaneous barely-organised actions
(Eliasoph 2013; Habermas 1989; Harris 2017).
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Covid era patterns appear to be different, since it is often in differences that we can
discern the emergence of new trends and new responses to social need (Timmer-
man and Tavory 2012). The paper concludes with some indications of emergent
issues for civil society as the UK looked towards recovery from the initial period of
crisis in the late summer of 2020.
2 Civil Society Responding to the Covid-19 Crisis:
Two early phases
This paper is structured around themes emerging from an analysis of documentary
data. The initial response by UK civil society to the crisis is conceptualised as
occurring in two distinct but overlapping phases. The first phase can be seen to
have occurred from the end of February 2020 to roughly mid-April when infection
and death rates were peaking and when civil society was hyper-active. In this
phase, responses to the crisis from civil society as well as politicians were focused
on health and social care including basic physical survival within the population.
The secondphase can be seen to have occurred from roughlymid-April to July 2020
when there was a growing sense of the pandemic coming under control, reflected
in the gradual easing of restrictions from early May. During this second phase
politicians’ focus shifted more towards education, employment and the economy,
matters which had had less attention when themain focus was on saving lives and
sustaining health and social care services . The next two sections examine these
phases in turn.
3 Civil Society Hyper-Active Initial Response
Phase
This section of the paper does not seek to provide a comprehensive account of all
civil society responses in the early weeks of the UK crisis. It focuses on those civil
society activities which emerged from a thematic analysis of documents available
in the late summer of 2020 when the research for this paper was conducted. It
highlights four key forms of civil society activity in the UK as the crisis deepened
and as civil society itself became pro-active in responding to the crisis: local re-
sponses to the needs of the most vulnerable in the population; volunteering with
established charities and voluntary associations; spontaneous initiatives; and
challenges of organisation and governance. The four aspects were not in practise
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self-contained but are presented separately here for clarity and to highlight the
range and variety of civil society activity in the period.
3.1 Responding Locally to Vulnerable People
The broad context for the civil society response to vulnerable people in the first few
weeks of the crisis was a UK government policy published on 21 March (Public
Health England 2020) intended to identify and advise people considered to be
‘clinically extremely vulnerable’ to complications should they be infected with the
virus. Initially this identified group comprised an estimated 1.5million people with
certain underlying health conditions. They were identified from National Health
Service (NHS) records and were requested to remain within their own homes for at
least an initial threemonth period. This group, designated as ‘shielded’, were to be
provided with free food supplies delivered weekly to their homes, as well as social
support in the form of ‘check in’ phone calls. Local governmental authorities were
charged by the national government with implementing this response but in
practise theywere only able to do so by recruiting andmanaging volunteers, either
new temporary volunteers, or volunteers already associated with local community
and voluntary agencies with which the local authorities had pre-existing collab-
orative relationships (LGA 2020).
The implementation of the ‘shielding’ policy was intended to ensure the basic
physical survival of a small but extremely vulnerable minority of the population.
However, it left a much larger, second-tier, group of people (at least a further
10 million) identified in government guidance as being at ‘moderate risk’ but for
whom no governmental support plans were in place. This was a group identified in
the national government’s own communications as vulnerable (‘likely to be more
seriously affected’) by reasonof age (beingover 70) or because of underlyingmedical
conditions including common conditions such as diabetes and heart disease (NHS
2020; UK Government 2020a). The government issued advice about how this group
should minimise contacts with others (by avoiding going out to buy groceries or
collect prescriptionmedication for example) but offerednophysical or social formsof
support, even for those living alone. Their difficult position was aggravated on 23
Marchwhen thewhole countrywas placed ‘in lockdown’ (that is the countrywas told
that all non-essential social contact must cease) and accessing essential supplies
became increasingly difficult for the whole population.
The problem of obtaining essential supplies if you were in the second-tier
vulnerable group advised to ‘socially isolate’, was exacerbated by the fact that
major supermarkets were unable to gear up quickly to meet the increased demand
for home delivery or even to replenish their in-store stocks (Butler, S. 2020). In any
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case, since home food delivery was only accessible to those with computers,
internet connections and the capacity to use them, some of the most vulnerable
were not only excluded from access to online government information but were
also unable to obtain food deliveries . Thus, those in the second-tier at-risk group
who did not wish to flout social isolation guidance and could not rely on nearby
family and friends, were reliant during March and early April on grassroots ini-
tiatives within civil society for the very basics of life.
In the early days of March, individuals and small informal groups took their
own initiatives to try to ensure that nobody at their own local level was left without
social contact and a volunteer to help with essential tasks. Such initiatives
included placing home-reproduced notes through house doors offering help. News
of early informal initiatives were widely shared through social media and widely
imitated, to the extent that most parts of the country were covered by informal
community-level initiatives during March. Very quickly many individual
neighbourhood-level initiatives shared knowledge and ideas and formed them-
selves into local, then national, networks under the banner of ‘Covid-19 Mutual
Aid’, guided by a principle of ‘community reciprocity’ rather than ‘delivery of
services‘ to those in need (Tiratelli and Kaye 2020).
3.2 Volunteering with Established Charities and Voluntary
Associations
Whereas ‘Covid-19Mutual Aid’ activitieswere a specific response to the crisis, were
initiated at the grassroots, and remained informal and self-regulating, much vol-
unteering also occurred via established charities and other formal third sector
organisations. Many of those wanting to help in the crisis who did not regard
themselves as being in the most at-risk categories, initially approached national
organisations, such as the British Red Cross or the Salvation Army, or social wel-
fare organisations such as those run by religious groupings, Caritas and Jewish
Care for example (ICN 2020). Many people dismissed or ‘furloughed’3 from their
regular employment turned to volunteering as a replacement activity and such
people swelled the numbers of those available to volunteer during the early weeks
of the crisis (Tiratelli and Kaye 2020)
It later became known, that established volunteer-involving organisations
were not in practise able to involve all the people who came forward to help in the
early weeks of the crisis (Butler, P. 2020). Charities were not geared up to integrate
3 The widely used American term ‘furlough’ refers in the UK to the Government’s ‘Job Retention
Scheme’ first announced in April 2020 and due to be phased out by October 2020 (HMRC 2020).
Familiar Patterns and New Initiatives 5
NPF-2020-0044_proof  7 January 2021  5:25 pm
CORRECTED PROOF
and manage a major influx of new untrained volunteers, they did not have many
additional opportunities for volunteers, and, as formally regulated organisations,
they were under an obligation to carry out costly and time-consuming safe-
guarding checks on potential volunteers before involving them.
3.3 Spontaneous Volunteering
The examples of compassion andwillingness to helpmentioned above can be seen
as illustrations of the well-studied phenomenon of ‘spontaneous volunteering’
which commonly occurs in times of crisis such as floods, hurricanes and earth-
quakes (Harris et al. 2016; Michel 2007). Numerous examples of spontaneous acts
of kindness to other human beings were reported in the early days of crisis
including, for example neighbours offering cooked food to each other. Children
locked down at home displayed in windows hand-painted rainbow symbols of
support for NHS workers (Doyle 2020). An initiative during the total lock-down
period to urge people to stand in front of their homes on Thursday evenings at
8.00 pm to ‘clap for the NHS’ rapidly spread throughout the country and became
institutionalised as a moment of noisy citizen solidarity as well as a gesture of
appreciation for the NHS (NHS Royal Free 2020).
Two aspects of the spontaneous volunteer response to the Covid-19 response
are noteworthy because they reflect special features of the Covid crisis in the UK.
One aspect was the numerous examples of individuals or small friendship groups
attempting to fill gaps in NHS health care services which are normally regarded as
a governmental responsibility.4 Thus individuals were reported to be making vi-
sors for NHS staff on home 3D printers or making medical scrubs on home sewing
machines as reports came in about shortages of personal protective equipment
(PPE) for front-line staff. Individuals were also reported to be collecting moistur-
isers and bottles ofwater for hospital staff or delivering home-made snacks for staff
on break periods (ECHO 2020). These can be seen as micro-initiatives within civil
society in the face of macro needs and gaps in governmental provision.
The second noteworthy aspect of the spontaneous volunteeringwas theway in
which regulations, safeguards and formal management systems were bypassed
with impunity in the face of an overwhelming national crisis and the keenness of
4 Although the UK’s NHS (National Health Service) is essentially a governmental agency and a
creature of the original ‘Welfare State’ of the 1940s, it is widely seen as an institution separate from
government andattitudes to theNHSarenot necessarily the sameas attitudes tonationalgovernment
at any one time. The NHS has retained its place as a respected and loved institution (Lowe 1999); the
respect was reaffirmed at the time of the 2012 London Olympics when it featured prominently in the
opening ceremonies, and during the Covid-19 crisis as described in this paper.
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volunteers and donors to just ‘do something’ (Tiratelli and Kaye 2020) Thus there
was no public mention in the early weeks of food standard regulations, security
risks posed by unscreened volunteers and cash donations, safeguarding issues,
data privacy and the need to train volunteers. From the start of the crisis hospitals
and clinics put strict measures in place to try to limit the spread of infection within
and between their facilities, measures which they were already well prepared to
implement. But as gaps appeared in provision not only for patients but also for
those treating patients, the emergency situation prompted a relaxation of rules
normally enforced on civil society actors (Charity Commission 2020).
Over time spontaneous initiatives morphed into more formal networks or
projects or were incorporated into more established third sector organisations – as
will be shown in the next section of this paper which looks at the second phase of
the civil society response.
3.4 Challenges of Organisation and Governance
The Covid-19 crisis in the UK led to a rapid rise in demand for services provided by
established charities.5 There was particular demand for services for people whose
usual support and care needs could no longer bemet by themselves or by their own
networks; including homeless people, or those in need of specialist medical care,
income or food help, practical daily help or help with child care and education. At
the same time as there was a huge increase in demand for third sector services,
those same agencies experienced steeply increased costs associatedwith adapting
their provision to the pandemic situation and recruiting more staff and volunteers
(NCVO 2020; Weakley 2020).
This steep rise in demand for services combined with increased costs, pre-
sented third sector boards and senior staff with an insoluble dilemma since they
occurred precisely at the moment when it became clear that future funding of their
organisations was in jeopardy because of restrictions on in-person encounters,
arising from thepandemic (Kenley 2020).MostUK third sector organisations do not
have substantial reserves; in fact philanthropic donors and regulators may
discourage the accumulation of reserves, arguing that money donated for public
benefit should be spent on public needs (Calabrese 2013). Thus many UK charities
and voluntary associations (including religious organisations such as local
churches) operate on a year-by-year basis, reliant on thrift shops, events and
fundraising campaigns to bring in a high proportion of their yearly income.
5 That is, those third sector organisations recognised by the Charity Commission for England and
Wales or equivalent bodies in Scotland and subject to legal regulation.
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The social distancing imperatives of the Covid-19 crisis, then, presented civil
society organisations with a threat of vastly reduced income at the very time when
demand for services and associated costs were increasing rapidly and unexpect-
edly. In effect, the legal and ethical obligations placed on charity trustees at the
start of the pandemic pulled them in opposing directions: to meet the needs of
those they were set up to benefit and also to act prudently to ensure the long-term
survival of their organisations.
The national government’s furlough scheme3 which was primarily intended to
help for-profit businesses survive the crisis, provided an incentive to income-
strapped third sector organisations to release their own staff from work duties in
order to try to ensure their organisations’ longer term survival. Yet insofar as third
sector organisations availed themselves of the furlough scheme, they were then
less able to deliver the very services which were their raison d’etre and at a time
when demand for those services was at its peak.
4 Civil Society Consolidation Phase
The second phase of the initial civil society response to the Covid-19 crisis began
around the middle to end of April when there was a growing sense that the
infection was coming under control and that the severe lockdown restrictions
might be eased. Politicians and commentators started to look towards consoli-
dation of early responses and, indeed, to the start of ‘recovery’. At this time poli-
ticians’ focus shifted more towards education, employment and the economy,
matters which had necessarily had less attention when the main focus was on
saving lives and ensuring the continuation of health and social care services. At the
beginning of April, and following intensive lobbying, it was announced that the
Government would offer £750 million in new funding for charities responding
to the crisis, of which nearly half would be for smaller community charities;
amounts immediately condemned as far too little by charities themselves (House of
Commons 2020; NCVO 2020; UK Government 2020b).
By themiddle of April local and regional governmental authorities had (mostly
successfully) found ways to implement the distribution of help to the ‘shielded’
group, albeit with the cooperation of local community groups and volunteers.
Local civil society networks were sufficiently well organised to be confident that
neighbours in need had been identified andwere being helped to obtain groceries,
prescription drugs and social support. The whole country was still ‘in lockdown’
but emotions stirred up by the high rates of death and illness, and the outstanding
commitment of hospital workers generated feelings of solidarity in the population.
8 M. Harris
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This section of the paper highlights five aspects of civil society activity in the
UK during the spring and summer period of 2020, up to roughly the end of July:
digital volunteering; network formation; citizen support for the NHS; the govern-
ment’s own initiative to recruit volunteers to support the NHS; and formalisation of
spontaneous informal initiatives. As with the section above on the first hyper-
active phase of civil society response, we do not attempt here to provide a
comprehensive account of all civil society activity in the UK in the second phase of
response. Rather we point to themes which emerged strongly from analysis of the
available documentary data.
4.1 Digitally Facilitated Citizen Action
In the first days andweeks of the Covid-19 crisis the ability to use digital technology
to obtain information and keep in contact with those beyond your own household
was at a premium. Those without access to a computer and the internet at home
(which included children not at school and people obliged to work from home)
were at a major disadvantage. There was a rapid rise in learning of new technol-
ogies but this also meant that, as time passed, there was a widening of the gap
between those whowere ‘digitally enabled’ and those digitally excluded (the latter
includingmany of themost vulnerable in the population and thosewith the lowest
incomes) (Watts 2020). The implications for civil society were simultaneous in-
creases and decreases in social connectedness, social solidarity and access to
information.
There was also an increase in digitally-enabled volunteering as those in
lockdown at home or designated as ‘vulnerable’ could nevertheless support
friends and neighbours or become involved with distanced volunteering schemes
(see, for example, AgeUK 2020).
4.2 Network Formation
Many of the informal grassroots groups initiated at the start of the crisis and
intended to support vulnerable people, gradually formed themselves into
mutually-supporting networks under the banner of ‘Covid-19 Mutual Aid’. By mid-
April these local networks were themselves forming into a nation-wide network,
sharing ideas and guidelines for volunteer recruitment and management (Tiratelli
and Kaye 2020).
Other networks also developed during the consolidation phase, especially at
the local level where informal links were made between civil society activities.
Familiar Patterns and New Initiatives 9
NPF-2020-0044_proof  7 January 2021  5:25 pm
CORRECTED PROOF
For example, groups providing cookedmeals for homeless people made links with
food banks so that surplus ingredients and meals were donated on rather than
wasted. Similarly food banks formed links with local distributers of government
food boxes to ‘shielders’, so that unwanted content of the free food boxes could be
passed on to others in need. Local religious congregationsmade links across faiths
to tackle local support and care needs (IFN 2020).
Networking also occurred between the more formal volunteer-involving
charities and associations. Many such formal organisations could not involve all
the volunteers who approached them at the start of the pandemic but as it became
known that this was a widespread phenomenon, systems were initiated for orga-
nisations to refer surplus potential volunteers to other charities who needed them.
Specialist schemes were also initiated to provide volunteering opportunities for
people on furlough (e.g. JVN 2020).
4.3 Grassroots Support for NHS Staff
As mentioned earlier in relation to ‘spontaneous volunteering’, there was an
outpouring of support – practical and moral – for NHS hospital staff as stories
emerged in March and April about the extreme stress being experienced by hos-
pital workers on Covid wards. Staff were working extended shifts wearing un-
comfortable protective clothing and attending to very sick and dying patients
(Royal Free London 2020). Some hospitals were reported to have severe shortages
of PPE for front-line staff (Kale 2020). They neededmore than gestures of solidarity
such as the Thursday night clapping and children’s pictures of rainbows. They
needed practical gestures such as help with obtaining groceries for their own
households, skin hydrating products, easy-to-eat meals for their short breaks and
ipads/tablets to enable patients to communicatewith loved oneswhowere banned
fromvisiting. Numerous initiatives developed at the local level to support hospitals
including collecting donated items and offers of car parking spaces from nearby
residents. These spontaneous gestures of help for NHS staff were consolidated and
formalised after the early weeks.
Although theNHS is essentially a governmental agency4, it has hybrid features
including charitable fundraising arms attached to hospitals. These ‘hospital
charities’ had existed for many years but they came into the spotlight as the
Covid-19 crisis continued and they became recipients of donations for ‘non-
essential’ items to support NHS staff, including mental health services. By July
2020, the network of such hospital charities called ‘NHS Charities Together’ had
received £130 million in public donations (UKFundraising 2020).
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4.4 NHS Emergency Responders Scheme
At the end of March when the infection rate was soaring and the country was in
lockdown, the national government, in partnership with some large national chari-
ties including the Royal Voluntary Service launched an appeal for the public to
participate in a volunteering programme to ‘support the NHS’. This launch was
apparently prepared without reference to voluntary sector infrastructure bodies or
any charities except the handful already trusted as partners by national government.
Itwas totally separate from thevarious civil society initiativesmentioned so far in this
paper. The government initiative was marketed as one intended to provide support
for non-hospitalised NHS patients (not necessarily Covid-19 patients) who needed
help with shopping, medicine collection and telephone contact (GoodSAM 2020).
As shown in the previous section of the paper, local grassroots initiatives had
been performing these very tasks at the local level from the start of the crisis. The
government initiative came at a point when vulnerable people (other than the
identified ‘shielded’ group) had been left to fend for themselves for many weeks.
The NHS project had some additional features in that, controversially and in
defiance of isolation guidelines at the time, it appealed for volunteers to drive
people to and frommedical appointments. It was also dependent organisationally
on a phone app (‘GoodSAM’) which matched volunteers on standby shifts to
people referred to the scheme by NHS doctors as needing help.
It was reported that 750,000 volunteers had been recruited to the scheme by 29
March (GoodSAM 2020) but later anecdotal evidence suggests that only a small
proportion of the people recruited as volunteers were actually deployed and of
those, only a small proportion had more than a handful of referrals to them. In
short there was over-recruitment. Many people came forward out of loyalty to the
NHS which is a much loved national ‘institution’4 but the scheme was apparently
launched without awareness of how much voluntary ‘helping’ had already been
taking place at a local level and without an assessment of the numbers of volun-
teers needed for the NHS scheme.
4.5 Formalisation of Spontaneous Initiatives
In the previous section we described the numerous helping initiatives which
sprang up during March in the early days of the crisis. During April and May many
of those informal initiatives coalesced with others and gathered momentum. As
they grew they becamemore systematically organised,while remaining essentially
informal initiatives below the radar of regulatory authorities and enforcement
agencies. An example of one such initiative is provided in this section to illustrate
Familiar Patterns and New Initiatives 11
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the process of rapid growth and formalisation which occurred after the initial
phases of enthusiasm and unregulated hyper-activity. It draws on the author’s
interview with ‘Amy’, founder and leader of a local spontaneous initiative called
‘You donate, we deliver’.6
When theCovid 19 crisiswasdevelopingduringMarch,Amyheard that a friendwas
baking treats for family members who were NHS hospital staff. Amy and her daughter,
who is a chef but was on furlough, made 130 muffins one day to be distributed to
hospitals. Amy then heard that hospitals were asking for help for staff on Covid wards
who did not have time to cook for themselves or eat properly during shifts or even get
food from the hospital canteen. They needed more than treats; they needed full nour-
ishing meals. Amy and her daughter startedmaking and packing meals which could be
quickly heated in amicrowave oven. But when it got to 100meals a day it was toomuch
for the two of them. So Amy asked friends for help and also put out an appeal for local
helpers on socialmedia. Shehadanoverwhelming response: ‘Everybodywas frightened
and everybody wanted to help’.
Demand from hospitals for meals for staff on Covid wards increased and Amy
realised inApril that ‘wewould have to set upa fund for food ingredients and involve the
wider community’. ‘YouDonate,WeDeliver’was established online with crowdfunding.
Its centre of operations, for administration and for cooks’ collection of donated food
items, was a small tent set up in the front yard of Amy’s home. By mid-May Amy was
coordinating a local teamof volunteers sourcing food, andmaking anddelivering about
600 meals a day. She herself developed at-speed the food hygiene rules for cooks to
follow.Her local groupwas linked into a network of similar groups: ‘anarmyof amateur
and professional chefs, 10 community hubs, and 17 delivery drivers’, all of them vol-
unteers. Early in June, as Covid restrictionswere easing, community infection rateswere
falling and some volunteers were returning from furlough to employment, the initiative
was wound up.
5 Discussion
5.1 Familiar Patterns of Civil Society Activity?
Did the Covid-19 crisis give rise to new kinds of civil society behaviour? Certainly
it seems to have accelerated the pre-existing trend towards micro and digital
6 The transcript of the interview was shared with Amy (not her real name) for checking and she
willingly agreed to it being shared in edited form in the context of an academic paper. The
interview was conducted by telephone due to Covid-19 restrictions on face to face meetings at the
time, June 2020.
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forms of volunteering which people can do from their own homes if they have
access to computer technology (Jochum and Paylor 2013). Similarly there are
indications that it may have encouraged those who had not volunteered before
to see volunteering as an opportunity to help others and help themselves; so it is
possible that the total levels of volunteer involvement will be found to have
increased as a result of the crisis, especially if there is a steep rise in unem-
ployment and people seek alternative ways of using their time while preparing
for return to paid employment (Roffe 2020). Yet, most of what has been described
in this paper seems mostly to confirm patterns already noted in earlier literature
about the pre-Covid era.
For example, past researchers have noted how an outpouring of spontaneous
volunteering occurs in times of emergencies such as flood or earthquakes (Michel
2007; Twigg and Mosel 2017). Citizens ‘arrive’ when emergencies arise, often
bringing their own equipment and their own ideas about how to respond. Many
such volunteers will not wait to be guided or directed and will not necessarily
approach established charities or official emergency responders. Earlier literature
on disasters has pointed to the wish of established charities for spontaneous
volunteers to work through them (Harris et al. 2016). The current paper adds a
proviso to this in that there was some evidence that those whowanted to volunteer
in the earlyweeks of the Covid-19 crisis could not in fact be absorbedby established
charities which were not geared up to rapidly check, train and integrate large
numbers of new volunteers.
Literature on disasters and emergencies has also noted the crucial role of
social media in informing people about where help is needed, what help is
needed and how people might respond appropriately (Alexander 2014). Social
media can rapidly put those in need in touch with those offering help and
disseminate information about changing locations of need. After the initial
confusion which often accompanies the start of a crisis, social media also pro-
vide signposting to established agencies which can involve volunteers or direct
them to opportunities. Similarly, during the early stages of the Covid-19 crisis in
the UK, social media were an important means through which information was
communicated at the local level about those who needed help and what kinds of
help were needed. Social media were also important in generating support for
NHS staff and in promulgating innovative ideas for expressions of citizen
solidarity.
Where social media were less helpful in the Covid-19 case was in giving advice
and information to some of the most vulnerable and those most in need of help.
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If they did not have home access to the internet, they could not access the various
guidance documents issued online by government agencies.7 Thus the Covid-19
crisis revealed both the benefits of social media in facilitating civil society activity
and also its limitations.
Other patterns described in this paper also echo earlier literature, including
the way in which civil society, even where it appears to be inactive or dormant
will be roused into swift responsive action in times of crisis (Milofsky 2008;
Solnit 2010). This point applies especially to neighbours who can become the
main source of help with basic needs in times of disaster (Rosenblum 2016). In
the case of the UK Covid-19 crisis, it took several weeks for national and local
governmental agencies to set up systems for distributing help to the identified
‘shielding’ group. During this time, civil society groups at the community
level not only identified and responded to local needs, they also cooperated
extensively with local governmental authorities in meeting urgent needs
(Locality 2020).
The stereotype of civil society as flexible, responsive and innovative
(Kramer 1981; Milbourne 2013; Wolch 1989) is largely confirmed by the current
study. At the neighbourhood level people rapidly self-organised (Twigg and
Mosel 2017); improvising systems for identifying and contacting those in need
of support and ignoring, where necessary, regulations on data protection and
safeguarding in order to deal with threats to human survival (Rosenblum 2016).
They developed new schemes for involving volunteers in new ways, such as
special volunteering schemes for those furloughed. They collaborated, coor-
dinated and supported local governmental care responses without waiting for
formal protocols or payment systems to be developed. And as time passed, they
developed informal networks to provide mutual support between initiatives to
ensure that resources were used efficiently and not wasted because of
competitive behaviour. The drive to collaborate overrode the drive to compete.
At the more formal level of established charities, trustees stepped up quickly
to support paid staff and get involved with operational activities; a phenome-
non also noted in earlier literature about nonprofits in organisational crises
(Wood 1996).
7 In fact, this point seems to have been recognised at an early stage by the national government as
the ‘shielded’ group were informed about their status, and about the arrangements to support
them by hard copy letters sent in the mail. Similarly the first comprehensive advice from the
national government about the crisis (UK Government 2020a) was delivered directly to people’s
homes in hard copy leaflet format.
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5.2 Common Patterns in Government/Civil Society
Relationships?
The data suggest that many features of the relationship between government and
civil society in the early months of the crisis, also echo earlier findings about that
relationship.
As suggested by theories which conceptualise the third sector in welfare states
playing a supplementary and/or complementary role in relation to state services
(Young 2000), the UK government in the crisis period took a lead role in identi-
fying, and responding to the needs of, those who were extremely vulnerable (the
‘shielders’). Their very lives were under threat. One of the government’s first Covid-
19-related decisive actions was to set up systems to meet basic survival needs of
this group. What is noteworthy about the Covid-19 example, however, is how low
the government set the ceiling for taking responsibility for the care of vulnerable
people. It identified just 1.5 million people as ‘extremely vulnerable’ and tried to
ensure their basic survival needs were met. Yet the next most vulnerable group of
over 10 million, although identified from the start by government, received no
governmental support, even though theywere told to ‘socially isolate’. It was left to
civil society in the form of established charities and local grassroots initiatives to
respond to the needs of this category of people.
Subsequent recognition by national government of this vital gap-filling role
performed by civil society in the first weeks of the crisis has been sparse, limited to
schemes whereby established charities can apply by competition for small grants
to help fund retrospectively some of their Covid-related services (NPC 2020). As in
past examples of cooperation and complementarity between civil society and
governmental services (Aiken and Harris 2017; Harris 2012) there has been a ten-
dency to blur the boundaries in public discussion about contributions of the two
sectors. There has been a generic focus on response and care. The impression
conveyed in policy statements has been that it is governmental agencies which
have been most effective in responding to crisis. This can be seen as a form of
government encroachment into civil society territory (Harris 2017).
This blurring of sector boundaries was evident too in the setting up of the NHS
Responders’ Scheme where the government’s chosen partners were large long-
established national charities. Despite the heavy input from those charities into
recruitment and management of the NHS volunteers, the initiative has been
badged as an NHS (i.e. governmental) initiative. As has been noted before (Cairns
and Harris 2011), governmental agencies which collaborate with the third sector,
tend to feel most comfortable working with formally structured charities whose
organisational form is familiar. Also, as in this case, when drawing in volunteers to
support governmental provision, they tend to ‘go large’ which can lead to
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bureaucratic rule-bound provision which negates the very rationale for drawing in
volunteers in the first place (Harris 2012)
Although there are some similarities between features of the government/civil
society relationship before and during the Covid crisis, some aspects of the rela-
tionship during the crisis are distinctive. One feature arises from the fact that
national government quickly delegated care of the extremely vulnerable to local
and regional levels of government. This opened up possibilities for local civil
society groups to become involved in crisis care responses, nominally led by local
governmental agencies. A second noteworthy feature is the way in which guide-
lines and regulations for the third sector, which have become increasingly tight
and sanction-enforced in recent years in the UK, were relaxed at the height of the
crisis; some officially relaxed (Charity Commission 2020) and some by ‘turning a
blind eye’ to matters such as data privacy, safeguarding and food safety Third, in
this crisis, and in response to strong lobbying, the national government instituted
some limited schemes to provide financial support to charities and associations
when it became clear that their usual fundraising sources would not be forth-
coming due to the Covid-19 crisis and related economic and social impacts.
5.3 Emergent Issues
This paper has provided a snapshot of civil society activity in the early months of
the Covid-19 crisis in the UK, using contemporary data. The future for civil society
in the UK is inevitably uncertain and dependent in part on the future trajectory of
viral infection. All the same,we can conclude this look at the first fewmonths of the
Covid-19 crisis by noting some emerging issues as at September 2020.8
As in other countries, UK civil society organisationswhich are dependent on year-
on-year fundraising (for example, through small cash collections, charity dinners and
thrift shops) are struggling to survive financially, as indicated above (Dayson 2020). At
time of writing it seems that we can expect further large-scale staff redundancies and
services cuts, along with a greater willingness to collaborate between the groupings
and organisations within civil society. In fact, there are indications that the civil
society landscape is likely to emerge from the crisis looking very different in terms of
composition, funding sources, staff structure and volunteer engagement.
8 Future researchers of civil society in the early months of the Covid period in the UK will have
access to more documentation and information than was available to the author at the time of
writing this paper in the late summer of 2020. This paper is inevitably limited by the data available
at the time of writing and the need to pause the research process to meet the agreed schedule for
the production of this Special Issue. It stands with other papers in this volume as a contemporary
snapshot of civil society activity in an exceptional historical period.
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These trends, in their turn, can be expected to place major stress on volunteer
governing boards and, as organisational belts are tightened, there is likely to be
withdrawal of services provided by civil society organisations in pre-Covid times.
In theUK, this is especially concerning because it is some of thosemost in need due
to the Covid-19 crisis who aremost dependent on third sector services, for example
people who are homeless, in poverty or experiencing mental ill-health. At the time
of writing in late Summer 2020, there are credible indications that children and
young people will have remedial needs due to long absences from education, and
that theUK criminal justice system is snarled in extensive delayswhich third sector
law centres could help to alleviate if they are able to continue in operation. The
crisis has revealed the extent to which major social problems in the UK (including
people trafficking, substance abuse and domestic abuse) are now responded to
largely by third sector organisations and groups whose very survival may be under
threat due to the impact of the pandemic on civil society. It remains to be seen if
financial support to civil society organisations becomes one of the national gov-
ernment’s spending priorities. Meanwhile we can expect patchy provision of care
and other services provided by civil society actors, and lack of long-term invest-
ment in medical and other forms of research by third sector organisations as they
switch available resources to funding current service provision and to responding
to the impact of the pandemic.
As the crisis abates it is to be expected that there will be less tolerance of
regulation avoidance and a return to tight control of civil society (Charity Com-
mission 2020). In the light of the apparent success of theNHSvolunteering scheme,
we may expect a return to an overtly instrumental view by government of civil
society as a useful ‘service provider’. We can also anticipate that, drawing on the
experience of the crisis, there will be further projects to draw volunteers into
implementing the government’s own policy agenda along with a lack of interest in
boundaries between the governmental and civil society sectors (Einasdottir and
Osia 2020; Kruger 2020). This latter point is perhaps concerning for those who
value a strong and independent civil society as a counterpoint to powerful gov-
ernments (Harris 2017; Harris and Milofsky 2019).
On the more positive side, it seems reasonable to anticipate a resurgence of
civil society activity associated with the Black Lives Matter movement as the crisis
abates and renewed cooperation between ethnic and faith groups building on the
trust generated during the crisis. We may also see a proliferation of innovative
forms of fundraising within civil society as charities adapt to the loss of income
from events and thrift stores.
There is an expectation amongst volunteering infrastructure charities that
there will be an upsurge in volunteering from those who have enjoyed their vol-
unteering experiences in the Covid era and have experienced the satisfaction that
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comes from helping others and working in solidarity with neighbours. Such new
and renewed commitment to citizen voluntary activity will be needed more than
ever as the Covid-19 tide retreats.
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